OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications: The AI Risks and the Controls That Stop Them

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  • By David
  • LLM

OWASP Top 10 for LLM Applications: The AI Risks and the Controls That Stop Them

As businesses rush to build applications on large language models, a new category of security risk has arrived with them. LLM-powered apps can be attacked, manipulated, and misused in ways traditional software can't, and teams building them often don't yet know what to watch for. The OWASP Top 10 for LLM applications is the response: a widely referenced list, maintained by the Open Worldwide Application Security Project, of the ten most critical security risks specific to applications built on large language models. Just as OWASP's original Top 10 became the standard reference for web application security, this list has become the go-to starting point for understanding and securing LLM apps, naming the risks that matter most and pointing toward how to address them. For any team building or deploying LLM applications, knowing these ten risks, and the controls that mitigate each, is foundational to doing it securely. This guide walks through all ten, explaining each risk in plain terms and the controls that stop it, so you can build LLM applications that are secure by design rather than vulnerable by default.

This guide covers each of the ten risks in the OWASP Top 10 for LLM applications and the key controls for each.

Why LLM Applications Need Their Own Security List

Before the ten risks, it's worth understanding why LLM applications need a dedicated security list at all. LLM apps introduce risks that traditional application security doesn't fully cover, because the LLM itself is a new kind of component: it takes natural-language input that can carry hidden instructions, it generates output that can't be fully predicted, it's often given access to tools and data, and it depends on models and data pipelines with their own vulnerabilities. These characteristics create attack surfaces, like manipulating the model through crafted input or exploiting its access, that standard security practices weren't designed for. The OWASP Top 10 for LLM applications exists to name these LLM-specific risks so teams can address them deliberately, complementing rather than replacing the broader security discipline covered in this guide to AI in cybersecurity. It's a security framework tuned to how LLM applications actually fail, which is exactly what teams building on this still-new technology need. With that context, here are the ten risks and how to stop each.

1. Prompt Injection

Prompt injection is the signature LLM risk: an attacker crafts input that manipulates the model into ignoring its intended instructions and doing something else, revealing data, taking unintended actions, or producing harmful output. It can be direct (malicious user input) or indirect (malicious instructions hidden in content the model processes, like a web page or document). Controls include treating all input as untrusted, constraining what the model is allowed to do, separating trusted instructions from untrusted content, validating and filtering inputs, and keeping a human in the loop for sensitive actions. Because prompt injection exploits the core way LLMs take instructions, it can't be eliminated entirely, so defense means limiting the damage a successful injection can do, which makes constraining the model's capabilities and access the most important mitigation.

2. Sensitive Information Disclosure

LLM applications can leak sensitive information, personal data, credentials, proprietary business information, or confidential content, through their outputs, whether because sensitive data was in the training data, the prompt, or the context the model can access, or because an attacker coaxed it out. The consequences range from privacy violations to exposed secrets. Controls include minimizing the sensitive data the model is exposed to, sanitizing and filtering inputs and outputs, enforcing strict access controls on what data the app and model can reach, and scrubbing training and context data of sensitive information that doesn't need to be there. The guiding principle is that the model can only disclose what it has access to, so limiting its exposure to sensitive data in the first place is the strongest control.

3. Supply Chain Vulnerabilities

LLM applications depend on a supply chain, pre-trained models, third-party components, datasets, libraries, and services, and vulnerabilities or compromises anywhere in it can undermine the application. A tampered or malicious model, a compromised dependency, or a poisoned dataset pulled from an untrusted source can introduce serious risk. Controls include vetting and verifying the provenance of models, data, and components, using trusted sources, checking integrity, maintaining visibility into dependencies, and applying the same supply-chain security discipline that mature software practices use. Treating the model and data supply chain as a security concern, rather than assuming third-party models and datasets are safe, is what closes this gap, and it draws on the broader security rigor explored in this guide to cloud and application security.

4. Data and Model Poisoning

Poisoning is the manipulation of the data used to train or fine-tune a model (or the model itself) to introduce vulnerabilities, biases, or backdoors, so the model behaves in ways the attacker intends. If an attacker can influence training or fine-tuning data, they can corrupt the model's behavior in subtle, hard-to-detect ways. Controls include securing and vetting training and fine-tuning data, verifying data sources and integrity, controlling who can influence the data and model, and monitoring model behavior for signs of manipulation. Because a poisoned model can look normal while harboring hidden flaws, protecting the integrity of the data and training pipeline, and sourcing models and data from trustworthy origins, is the core defense against this risk.

5. Improper Output Handling

LLM output can't be trusted blindly, and improper output handling, passing the model's output to other systems without proper validation, is a serious risk. If an application takes LLM output and feeds it into a database query, a command, a web page, or another system without validating or sanitizing it, an attacker who manipulates the output can trigger injection attacks, code execution, or other downstream harm. Controls include treating LLM output as untrusted, validating and sanitizing it before using it, encoding it appropriately for its destination, and never passing it directly into sensitive operations without checks. The principle mirrors classic application security: just as user input must be validated, so must LLM output, because it can be influenced by attackers and should never be trusted implicitly as it flows into the rest of the system.

6. Excessive Agency

Excessive agency is the risk of giving an LLM too much autonomy, access, or capability, so that when it misbehaves (through manipulation, error, or unexpected output) it can cause real harm. An LLM granted broad permissions, access to many tools, or the ability to take consequential actions can do significant damage if something goes wrong, which, given prompt injection and unpredictable output, it can. Controls include granting the model the least privilege necessary, limiting the tools and actions it can access, requiring human approval for consequential actions, and constraining its autonomy to what the use case genuinely needs. This risk is especially important for agentic systems, and the mitigation, minimizing the model's agency and keeping humans in control of what matters, is a cornerstone of deploying LLM applications safely, reflecting the responsible-AI oversight explored in this guide to AI governance.

7. System Prompt Leakage

Applications often rely on system prompts, hidden instructions that shape the model's behavior, and system prompt leakage is the risk that these are exposed, revealing sensitive instructions, logic, or even secrets mistakenly placed in them. If attackers can extract the system prompt, they learn how the application works and how to manipulate it, and any sensitive data wrongly embedded in the prompt is exposed. Controls include never putting secrets or sensitive data in system prompts, not relying on the system prompt staying hidden as a security measure, and enforcing security through proper controls outside the prompt rather than through the prompt's secrecy. The key lesson is that system prompts should be assumed potentially exposable, so security must never depend on their confidentiality, and nothing sensitive should live in them.

8. Vector and Embedding Weaknesses

Many LLM applications use vector databases and embeddings (for retrieval-augmented generation and similar techniques), and weaknesses here are a distinct risk. Vulnerabilities in how embeddings and vector stores are generated, stored, accessed, and used can lead to data leakage, manipulation of what the model retrieves, or injection of malicious content through the retrieval pipeline. Controls include securing the vector database and its access, validating and controlling what gets embedded and retrieved, applying access controls so users can't retrieve data they shouldn't, and treating retrieved content as untrusted input subject to the same scrutiny as any other. As retrieval-based architectures become standard for grounding LLMs in real data, securing the vector and embedding layer, rather than assuming it's safe, becomes an essential part of LLM application security.

9. Misinformation

LLMs can generate false, misleading, or fabricated information (hallucinations) and present it convincingly, and misinformation is the risk that an application relies on or propagates this, leading to bad decisions, harm, or loss of trust. When users or downstream systems treat confident-sounding LLM output as fact without verification, errors can cause real damage. Controls include not relying on LLM output as authoritative without verification, grounding the model in trusted data (for example through retrieval), providing accuracy safeguards and human review for consequential outputs, and designing the application and user experience so people understand the output may be wrong and know to verify it. The core mitigation is never treating LLM output as inherently reliable, and building in grounding, verification, and oversight proportional to how consequential the output is.

10. Unbounded Consumption

Finally, unbounded consumption is the risk that an LLM application's resource use, computation, API calls, and the associated cost, isn't properly bounded, so it can be abused or run away. Attackers can exploit this to drive up costs (a denial-of-wallet attack), degrade service, or overwhelm the system, and even without attackers, unbounded usage can produce runaway bills and instability. Controls include rate limiting, usage quotas and caps, monitoring consumption, input size limits, and controls that bound how much any user or request can consume. Because LLM calls cost real money and compute, treating consumption as something to be deliberately bounded and monitored, rather than left open, protects both the application's availability and the organization's budget, closing out the ten risks the OWASP list covers.

FAQs

Q1. What is the OWASP Top 10 for LLM applications?

It's a widely referenced list, maintained by the Open Worldwide Application Security Project (OWASP), of the ten most critical security risks specific to applications built on large language models. Just as OWASP's original Top 10 became the standard reference for web application security, this list has become the go-to starting point for understanding and securing LLM apps, naming the risks that matter most (such as prompt injection, sensitive information disclosure, and excessive agency) and pointing toward the controls that address each.

Q2. What is the most important risk in the OWASP LLM Top 10?

Prompt injection is often considered the signature LLM risk: an attacker crafts input that manipulates the model into ignoring its intended instructions, potentially revealing data, taking unintended actions, or producing harmful output. It's significant because it exploits the core way LLMs take instructions and can't be fully eliminated. That said, all ten risks matter, and several (like excessive agency and improper output handling) are closely tied to prompt injection, since limiting what a manipulated model can do is central to defending against it.

Q3. How do I secure an LLM application?

Address each of the ten OWASP risks: treat all input and model output as untrusted and validate it; minimize the sensitive data and privileges the model can access; grant least agency and require human approval for consequential actions; vet your model and data supply chain; secure training data and the vector/embedding layer; never put secrets in system prompts; ground outputs and verify consequential ones; and bound resource consumption with rate limits and quotas. The common thread is constraining what the model can access and do, and never trusting its input or output implicitly.

Q4. Is LLM application security different from traditional application security?

Yes, though it builds on it. LLM apps introduce risks traditional security doesn't fully cover, because the LLM takes natural-language input that can carry hidden instructions, generates unpredictable output, is often given tools and data access, and depends on models and data pipelines with their own vulnerabilities. This creates new attack surfaces like prompt injection and model poisoning. The OWASP Top 10 for LLM applications exists precisely because these LLM-specific risks need dedicated attention alongside, not instead of, standard application security practices.

Q5. Does the OWASP LLM Top 10 cover agentic AI risks?

It covers risks highly relevant to agentic AI, especially excessive agency, the risk of giving an LLM too much autonomy, access, or capability, so that when it misbehaves it can cause real harm. Agentic systems, which give models tools and the ability to take actions, make this and related risks (prompt injection, improper output handling) especially important. The controls, least privilege, limited tool access, and human approval for consequential actions, are foundational to deploying agentic LLM applications safely.

Final Thoughts

The OWASP Top 10 for LLM applications gives teams building on large language models something they badly need: a clear, authoritative map of the security risks specific to this new technology, and a starting point for addressing them. The ten risks, prompt injection, sensitive information disclosure, supply chain vulnerabilities, data and model poisoning, improper output handling, excessive agency, system prompt leakage, vector and embedding weaknesses, misinformation, and unbounded consumption, span the ways LLM apps actually fail, and each has concrete controls that reduce it. Running through nearly all of them is a single discipline: constrain what the model can access and do, and never trust its input or output implicitly. LLM applications are powerful, but they're also a genuinely new attack surface, and building them securely means treating these risks as first-class concerns from the design stage rather than bolting on security later. Teams that work through the OWASP Top 10 deliberately, pairing each risk with its controls, build LLM applications that are secure by design, which is exactly what deploying this technology responsibly requires. Getting it right draws on experienced security and AI development expertise, and on building AI that is genuinely safe and trustworthy from the ground up.

Building LLM applications and want them secured against these ten risks from the start? Book a free consultation with ATH Infosystems' AI and security experts today.